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Analytic philosophy and history: a mismatch
Abstract
In recent years, even some of its own practitioners have accused analytic philosophy of lacking
historical awareness. My aim is to show that analytic philosophy and history are not such a mismatch
after all. Against the objection that analytic philosophers have unduly ignored the past I argue that for
the most part they only resist strong versions of historicism, and for good reasons. The history of
philosophy is not the whole of philosophy, as extreme historicists maintain, nor is it indispensable to
substantive philosophizing, as mainline historicists have it, it is merely advantageous (pragmatic
historicism). Against the objection that analytic histories of philosophy are inevitably anachronistic I
argue that it is possible to approach past texts with a view to substantive issues and in a critical spirit
(contrary to historicist relativism and to misguided interpretations of the principle of charity). Indeed,
such an analytic approach makes not just for better philosophy but also for better history.
Analytic philosophy and history Mind 3024: 27/03/2008;7:25 PM 
 1
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY:  
A MISMATCH? 
Hans-Johann Glock 
 
In recent years, even some of its own practitioners have accused analytic philosophy of lacking 
historical awareness. My aim is to show that analytic philosophy and history are not such a 
mismatch after all. Against the objection that analytic philosophers have unduly ignored the past I 
argue that for the most part they only resist strong versions of historicism, and for good reasons. 
The history of philosophy is not the whole of philosophy, as extreme historicists maintain, nor is it 
indispensable to substantive philosophizing, as mainline historicists have it, it is merely 
advantageous (pragmatic historicism). Against the objection that analytic histories of philosophy 
are inevitably anachronistic I argue that it is possible to approach past texts with a view to 
substantive issues and in a critical spirit (contrary to historicist relativism and to misguided 
interpretations of the principle of charity). Indeed, such an analytic approach makes not just for 
better philosophy but also for better history. 
 
 
Lack of historical awareness is one of the prime accusations against analytic 
philosophy. It unites traditionalist philosophers devoted to the study of the 
philosophia perennis with avant-garde ‘continental’ philosophers. From a 
continental perspective, Rorty accuses analytic philosophers of trying ‘to escape 
from history’ (1979, pp.8–9). From a traditionalist perspective, Ayers lambastes 
analytic philosophy for its historiographical failings (1978). Combining both 
perspectives, Rée complains about analytic philosophers’ ‘condescension’ 
towards the past (1978, p.28) and Wilshire takes exception to their ‘radically 
ahistorical and modern-progressivist point of view’ (2002, p.4). More recently, 
some who by common consent are analytic philosophers themselves have joined 
this chorus of complaints. This prima facie surprising fact is due in part to the 
establishment of the history of analytic philosophy as a recognized field of study 
over the last twenty years (see Beaney 1998). Historians of the analytic movement 
like Sluga (1980, p.2), Baker (1988, p.ix) and Hylton (1992, p.vii) regularly 
deplore its lack of historical self-consciousness. But the issue has also received 
additional attention through the late Bernard Williams, who urged philosophy to 
adopt a more historical and genetic perspective in general (2002a). 
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 I use the label ‘historicism’ in a wide sense, for any position which 
promotes historical thinking in philosophy and warns against ignoring or 
distorting the past. There is an ongoing debate about the virtues of ‘doing 
philosophy historically’ (Piercey 2003). Unfortunately, it suffers from a failure to 
distinguish more specific types of historicism. 
 According to extreme historicism, proper philosophy is ipso facto 
historical as regards both its methods and its conclusions. Thus Krüger assures us 
that the reason for studying history is not just the ‘pragmatic’ one of ‘studying 
historical material in order to produce trans-historical philosophical insight’, since 
the only philosophical insights to be had are themselves historical in nature (1984, 
p.79+n). In the same vein, Critchley repudiates the ‘validity of the distinction 
between philosophy and the history of philosophy operative in much of the 
analytic tradition’, because of the ‘essential historicity’ of philosophy in particular 
and human culture in general (2001, p.62). Extreme historicism confines 
philosophy to the interpretation of past intellectual productions, notably in the 
hermeneutic tradition to which Krüger belongs, and to historical explanations of 
how they emerged from social conditions, especially in the Nietzschean and 
Marxist traditions on which Critchley draws. According to mainline historicism, 
studying the past is indispensable, yet only as a means of reaching conclusions 
which themselves are not historical in nature. This view is exemplified by Taylor, 
who holds that one ‘cannot do’ substantive philosophy without also doing history 
of philosophy (1984, p.17). Finally, according to pragmatic historicism, studying 
the past is useful to such a pursuit without being indispensable (Hare 1988, p.12; 
Kenny 2005). 
 We must also distinguish two historicist criticisms. The first is that 
analytic philosophers tend to ignore or despise the past—for want of a better label 
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I shall call this the charge of historiophobia. The second is that in so far as they 
consider the past, they distort it, namely by reading features of the present into 
it—the charge of anachronism. Mainstream analytic philosophers have tended to 
ignore such criticisms. This is a serious failure. The historicist attacks raise 
important philosophical issues. They continue unabated within academic 
philosophy, and they are propounded as received wisdom by cultural critics (e.g. 
Romano 2003). 
 My aim is to redress this failure by engaging the historicist critics in a 
sustained debate. Analytic philosophy and history are not such a mismatch, even 
though they have been through some rough patches. Sections 1–4 rebut the first 
charge. Analytic philosophers do not in general ignore history, they merely resist 
strong versions of historicism. Rightly so. Extreme historicism is misguided. 
Mainstream historicism is more attractive, and will therefore be my main target in 
these sections. I hope to show that the case for it remains unproven, since the 
arguments support at most a version of pragmatic historicism. Sections 5–7 deal 
with the second charge. Some forms of analytic historiography are anachronistic. 
What characterizes the analytic approach to the past, however, is rather the 
ambition of engaging with historical texts in an argumentative spirit, in order to 
draw lessons for ‘trans-historical’ philosophical problems. This problem-oriented 
and critical historiography is superior both to the historical relativism of extreme 
historicists and to the excessively pious approach to past philosophy implied by 
certain hermeneutic principles. Proper analytic historiography makes not just for 
better philosophy, but also for better history. While I mention specific historical 
cases to substantiate my claims, reasons of space prevent me from discussing 
them in detail. Instead, I hope to show that the general arguments behind blanket 
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historicist condemnations of analytic philosophy can be resisted on 
metaphilosophical, historiographical and hermeneutic grounds. 
 
1. Analytic Philosophy and Historiophobia 
Many analytic philosophers pride themselves on the ahistorical nature of their 
enterprise. Analytic enemies of metaphysics condemned traditional philosophy as 
predominantly nonsensical or misguided. And at present a popular naturalistic 
story has it that analytic philosophy is a scientific discipline; it uses well-
controlled techniques to tackle discrete problems with definite results, and hence 
no more needs to seek refuge in discussing the past than natural science. Quine is 
credited with the quip: ‘There are two kinds of people interested in philosophy, 
those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy’ 
(MacIntyre 1984: 39–40). And Williams reports: ‘in one prestigious American 
department a senior figure had a notice on his door that read JUST SAY NO TO 
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY’ (1996, p.18). The culprit turns out to be 
Harman (Sorell 2005, pp.43–4). But it could equally have been Fodor, who boasts 
about his ‘ignorance of the history of philosophy’ and his ability to write a ‘book 
about Hume without actually knowing anything about him’ (2003, p.1). 
 On this issue, there is even convergence between Fodor and Wittgenstein. 
According to Ryle, Wittgenstein ‘not only properly distinguished philosophical 
from exegetic problems but also, less properly, gave the impressions, first, that he 
himself was proud not to have studied other philosophers—which he had done, 
though not much—and second, that he thought that people who did study them 
were academic and therefore unauthentic philosophers, which was often but not 
always true’. Ryle, by contrast, balked at the superior attitude towards previous 
philosophy which he detected in Wittgenstein and the Vienna circle. Not only had 
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figures of the past ‘sometimes said significant things’, they should be treated 
‘more like colleagues than like pupils’ (1971, pp.10–11). 
 As this quotation demonstrates, historiophobia is not a universal affliction 
among analytic philosophers. In fact, many of them have laid claim to the 
philosophical mantle of thinkers from the past (see Glock 2008, pp.92–3). Thus 
Oxford philosophers like Ryle drew extensively on ancient philosophy (though 
their approach has been condemned as anachronistic, see Annas 2004).  Indeed, 
since the 1960s there has been an upsurge in analytic work on the entire history of 
philosophy, prompting von Wright to speak of a ‘retrospective turn’ (1993, p.47).  
 Ryle’s passage also indicates, however, that there remains a conflict with 
stronger versions of historicism. Analytic philosophers insist that the exegetical 
question of what a philosopher believed can and must be distinguished from the 
substantive question of whether those beliefs are correct (e.g. Russell 1900, pp.xi–
xii). By the same token, there is a difference between philosophy and the history 
of philosophy, contrary to extreme historicism. They also insist that any 
philosophical insights to be gained from studying the past can be discovered 
independently at least in principle, and that they can be developed without 
sustained historiography, contrary to mainline historicism. The next three sections 
reject extreme historicism and resist the arguments in favour of mainline 
historicism, whilst defending pragmatic historicism. 
 
2. Extreme Historicism 
Naturalistic historiophobes rely on two premises: first, proper philosophy is part 
of or continuous with natural science, and should therefore emulate the latter’s 
aims and methods; secondly, natural science is thoroughly ahistorical. ‘A science 
that hesitates to forget its founders is lost’ (Whitehead 1929, p.107). Scientific 
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research rarely proceeds by arguing with the great dead, and students of the 
natural sciences are not introduced to their subject through its history. 
 Nevertheless, some extreme historicists have tried to advance their cause 
by accepting the first premise while repudiating the second. Drawing on Kuhn, 
Krüger insists that a scientific theory T2 cannot be judged solely by comparing it 
to the empirical evidence; it must also be pitted against the previously accepted 
theory T1. Scientific theories can only be understood as alternatives to their 
historical predecessors, because the empirical evidence is equally compatible 
with different theories (1984, p.93). MacIntyre is even more forthright: ‘the 
history of natural science is in a way sovereign over the natural sciences. …, the 
superior theory in natural science is that which affords grounds for a certain kind 
of historical explanation’. By the same token, the history of philosophy ‘is 
sovereign over the rest of the discipline’. The ultimate test of a philosophical 
theory ‘occurs not at all at the level of argument’, but rests on its capacity to 
provide a historical explanation of its rivals (1984, pp.44, 47). 
 Kuhn was right to insist that scientific rationality can only be understood 
by looking not just at the formal structure of scientific theories but also at their 
historical development. Scientific theories emerge through evolution and, on 
occasion, revolution rather than out of the blue. However, this no more entails that 
the criterion of scientific success is the explanation of these historical 
developments than the historical emergence of culinary styles entails that the true 
test of recipes lies in their ability to sustain a history of cooking. Scientists 
evaluate theories according to their power to explain and predict empirical data, as 
well as subsidiary criteria such as simplicity, conservatism, modesty, precision 
and facility of computation. Proponents of a new theory T2 indeed have ample 
motivation to explain both the failures and the successes of a preceding orthodoxy 
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T1. But their target is not to provide a historical explanation of T1 itself, an 
account of its origins and development, of the motivations of its proponents and 
its cultural and political context. It is rather to provide a scientific explanation of 
the natural phenomena that are of relevance to the tenability of T1. 
 Krüger sets store by the thesis that scientific theories are undetermined by 
the empirical data. Even if correct, however, the underdetermination-thesis entails 
only that in assessing the cognitive virtues of T2 we cannot rely solely on 
empirical evidence but must draw on other considerations as well, concerning for 
instance pragmatic virtues like simplicity.  It does not entail that we must compare 
and contrast T2 with a historical rival T1. Indeed, some scientific theories lack 
predecessors, either because they mark the dawn of a discipline or because they 
concern newly discovered phenomena such as quasars or autism. Finally, even 
where a scientific theory pits itself against a rival, this process is not 
historiographical. The interest T2 takes in T1 concerns only what the latter 
maintains about nature, not how it arose. 
 Neither scientists nor philosophers can afford to disregard the theories of 
their immediate predecessors, since these are the rivals against which they have to 
prove their mettle. I see no evidence, however, that naturalistic historiophobes 
counsel such complete abstinence. In any event, as regards remote predecessors 
the current argument does not even deliver the pragmatic thesis that it is beneficial 
to take an interest in them, let alone the stronger claim that it is unavoidable. 
 Unsurprisingly, most extreme historicists instead contest the first premise 
of the naturalistic argument, the claim that philosophy is part of or continuous 
with natural science. Their preferred route has been to align philosophy with the 
humanities and social sciences. For Gadamer (1960), philosophy is 
‘hermeneutics’, an investigation of the method of interpretation, because the 
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fundamental structures and limits of human existence are determined by the 
interpretation of meaningful actions and their products. Philosophy turns into a 
dialogue with texts and with the history of their effects. One of the historical blind 
spots of analytic philosophers is supposed to be that they are oblivious to the need 
of situating ourselves in the Gadamerian ‘conversation which we are’ (Rorty et al. 
1984, p.11).  
 There is no gainsaying that the cultural sciences are inherently historical, 
since they seek to describe and explain the development of evolving human 
practices. If philosophy were simply one of the Geisteswissenschaften, it  would 
be intrinsically historical. Natural and cultural sciences do not exhaust the options, 
however. Traditionally philosophy, like logic and mathematics, has been regarded 
as a priori, independent of sensory experience. Its problems cannot be solved, its 
propositions cannot be supported or refuted, by observation or experiment, 
irrespective of whether these concern the natural world or human culture. 
 Though derided by naturalists, this rationalist picture has recently found 
support from numerous, otherwise diverse quarters (see, e.g., 
Boghossian/Peacocke 2000). What is more, it has one singular advantage, namely 
that it squares well with the actual practice of contemporary philosophers, 
naturalists included. Philosophy as a distinctive intellectual pursuit is constituted 
at least in part by problems of a peculiar kind. These problems are supremely 
abstract and fundamental, and they include questions such as ‘Can we acquire 
genuine knowledge?’, ‘How is the mind related to the body?’ and ‘Are there 
universally binding moral principles?’. Philosophy cannot afford to ignore 
empirical findings from either the natural sciences or the humanities. Yet there is 
at least a powerful case for regarding it as a priori in the following minimal sense: 
the distinctively philosophical disputes concern not the empirical data themselves, 
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but at most the relevance they have for such problems. The genuinely 
philosophical task is not to expand the corpus of empirical knowledge, but to 
organize what is known in a coherent manner.  
 If there is a kernel of truth to this idea, it will apply to the cultural sciences 
with a vengeance. If even neuroscience cannot solve the mind-body problem by 
itself, cultural sciences like sociology and history will be completely out of their 
depths. There is no reason why the empirical findings of these disciplines should 
possess greater potency for solving philosophical problems than those of the 
natural sciences. It is equally clear that such problems cannot be solved or 
dissolved simply by historical research into their origins. Observations about the 
social and historical circumstances within which Descartes espoused a substance 
dualism neither answer the mind-body problem, nor do they show it to be 
misguided. If philosophy were transformed into a cultural science or reduced to a 
history of ideas, it would no longer speak to the philosophical problems. 
 This explains an ironical consequence of extreme historicism. The 
overwhelming majority of the great philosophers of the past did precisely not 
reduce philosophy to history of philosophy, whether it be the scholarly 
interpretation of texts or the scrutiny of the social context of their production. 
Instead, they tackled non-historical problems and aspired to insights of a non-
historical kind. Extreme historicists can only collapse philosophy into the 
interpretation of previous philosophy if they regard these ambitions as deluded 
and the resulting efforts as misguided. Such a rejection of the very project of 
substantive philosophy is epitomized by a dictum occasionally attributed to 
Burton Dreben: ‘Philosophy is rubbish, but the history of rubbish is scholarship’. 
There is even a pertinent argument which would favour this defeatism, namely 
that there are no ‘timeless’ philosophical problems and that philosophical ideas 
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can have validity at best relative to a specific historical context. But in section 6 I 
shall argue that this historicist relativism is flawed. In any event, if defeatism were 
correct the scholarly study of philosophical ‘rubbish’ could hardly have the 
intrinsic importance that extreme historicists assign to it. As a result, extreme 
historicism faces a dilemma. Either the giants of yore were right to believe that 
history is not all there is to philosophy. Or they were fundamentally mistaken 
about the nature and value of their own enterprise, which greatly diminishes the 
appeal of studying them.  
 
3. Philosophy and the Framework 
The rationalist conception provides a rationale for being sceptical even about 
mainline historicism. It implies that philosophy depends on a priori reflections 
concerning atemporal concepts and logical structures, rather than on empirical 
historical studies. In the Preface to the Prolegomena Kant wrote: 
There are scholars to whom the history of philosophy is itself their 
philosophy; the present Prolegomena are not written for them. They 
will have to wait until those who endeavour to draw from the fountain 
of reason have finished their business, and thereupon it will be their 
turn to apprise the world of what happened. 
There is a distinctively Kantian tradition within analytic philosophy. It shares both 
the view that philosophy differs from all empirical disciplines and the reservations 
about the relevance of history. Kant’s distinction between quaestio facti and 
quaestio iuris and the ensuing neo-Kantian distinction between genesis and 
validity fuelled a pervasive, if largely implicit, suspicion of the so-called ‘genetic 
fallacy’, the mistake of deducing claims about the validity of a theory or the 
content of a concept from information about its historical origins and the causes 
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for its emergence. Thus Frege granted that ‘the historical perspective’ has a 
certain justification, while insisting that one cannot divine the nature of numbers 
from psychological investigations into the way in which our thinking about 
numbers evolved (1884: Introduction). 
 In one respect, however, rationalism points in the opposite direction. If 
philosophy is a priori, its past efforts cannot simply be superseded by novel 
empirical results; hence they may have something to teach us, just as pragmatic 
historicism has it. Kant allows for this possibility. He only resists the view that 
history of philosophy is philosophy enough. This view was powerful in the 
eighteenth century doxography that Kant lampooned, and it re-emerges in extreme 
historicists of the present. 
 Willy-nilly, Kant even inspired mainline historicism. For Kant philosophy 
is a priori not because it describes abstract entities or essences, but because it is 
not concerned with objects of any kind. Instead, it is a second-order discipline 
which reflects on the preconditions of experiencing ordinary objects, that is, on 
the conceptual scheme that science and common sense presuppose in their 
descriptions and explanations of reality. Kant treats this scheme as an immutable 
mental structure—‘pure reason’. From Hegel onwards, however, it was held that 
our scheme can change, at least in parts. For Hegel ‘philosophy [is] its time 
apprehended in thought’ (Philosophy of Rights: Preface). It articulates and 
synthesizes the different branches of a culture into a superior form of wisdom. 
Less ambitiously, according to Collingwood (1940), metaphysics spells out the 
‘absolute presuppositions’ of an epoch, fundamental intellectual commitments 
that can only be brought to light with the benefit of hindsight through historical 
reflection. A related mutation of the Kantian picture emerged in Wittgenstein. He 
accepted that philosophical problems defy empirical solution because they are 
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rooted in our conceptual scheme rather than reality. Unlike Kant, Wittgenstein 
regarded this scheme as embodied in language, a social practice which is subject 
to change. Though personally immune to the charms of historical scholarship, 
Wittgenstein opened the door to a historical understanding of concepts and of the 
philosophical problems to which they give rise. Philosophy is not ipso facto 
history, yet historical knowledge may be indispensable to tackling the conceptual 
problems with which it deals. 
 Several mainline historicists follow this trajectory. They assume that 
philosophy aims at a special kind of self-understanding, an understanding not so 
much of the non-human world as of our thoughts and practices. In the words of 
Williams: 
The starting point of philosophy is that we do not understand 
ourselves well enough.... Philosophy’s methods of helping us to 
understand ourselves involve reflecting on the concepts we use, the 
modes in which we think about these various things [nature, ethics, 
politics]; and it sometimes proposes better ways of doing this (2002a, 
p.7). 
Similarly, for Taylor, philosophy ‘involves a great deal of articulation of what is 
initially inarticulated’, namely the fundamental assumptions behind the way we 
think and act (1984, p.18). 
 Instead of Collingwood’s ‘absolute presuppositions’, let us use the more 
neutral label ‘framework’ for the system of concepts, modes of thought and 
assumptions that underlie a given culture. As Williams acknowledges, the 
immediate philosophical task is to articulate our current framework, since the 
‘concepts which give rise to the [philosophical] questions are ours’ (2002a, p.7). 
Why then should philosophy require an understanding of the past? 
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 Mainline historicists can rise to this challenge in two ways. One is to argue 
that philosophy must look at the history of the philosophical characterizations of 
our framework; the other is to argue that it must take into account the 
development of that framework itself. 
 Taylor chooses the first option, arguing that we can only articulate our 
world-view successfully by recovering previous articulations. According to him, 
the most successful challengers to Cartesian conceptions of mind and language—
Hegel, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—had recourse to history. Taylor recognizes 
the objection that ‘it didn’t have to be so’; these critics just happened to be 
German and French professors with ‘a notorious professional deformation which 
makes them compulsively engage in expositions and re-interpretations of the 
canonical texts’ (1984, p.19). Worse still, it wasn’t even so. Wittgenstein’s attack 
on Cartesianism is at least as compelling; yet it is entirely ahistorical, revolving 
instead around a dialogue with a fictitious interlocutor. 
 Taylor’s second argument seeks to exclude the possibility of non-historical 
philosophical criticism ab initio. It maintains that the only way of appreciating 
that a prevailing philosophical position is merely ‘one of a range of alternatives’ is 
learning about its origins and the prior orthodoxies that the current one had to 
contend with. ‘[Y]ou need to understand the past in order to liberate yourself’, 
because this is the only way of realizing that there are alternatives to the status 
quo (1984, pp.20–2; similarly Baker 1988, p.xvii). 
 This line of reasoning is vulnerable on several counts. First, even if one 
can challenge a given philosophical articulation A2 only by being acquainted with 
an alternative A1, that alternative need not lie in the past. Synchronic diversity can 
take the place of diachronic diversity. Secondly, even if some articulations are 
without extant competitors, we would only have to know a past articulation. It 
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would not follow that we have to know the history leading from A1 to A2.  A 
doxographic comparison of positions without reference to chronological 
development would do just as well. 
 Both objections are avoided by Williams (2006, ch.16). Just as the 
‘naturalistic’ historicists discussed in section 2 maintain that scientific theories 
need to provide a historical account of their emergence from their predecessors, 
Williams intimates that philosophical articulations of our framework must furnish 
a ‘vindicatory explanation’ of their emergence from their predecessors. As in the 
scientific case, however, this insistence on a genetic account portrays the debate 
as more self-reflexive than it is or need be. Even in the case of philosophical 
articulations of our framework, the crux of the matter is whether A2 accounts for 
its subject-matter more successfully than A1, not whether it can provide a 
laudatory explanation of its own emergence. Any vindicatory explanation of A2’s 
emergence presupposes a demonstration of its substantive superiority over A1, 
rather than the other way around. 
 Finally, both Williams and Taylor maintain that one can only overcome a 
philosophical position An if one is familiar with a prior position An-1 from which it 
emerged. Fortunately, that contention is belied by astute yet historically 
uneducated critics like Frege, Wittgenstein or Quine. It also engenders a vicious 
regress. For it entails that our immediate predecessors could only have moved 
from An-1 to An because they were already familiar with An-2, and so on. Yet this is 
one regress of which we know that it stops somewhere. For a vast majority of 
cases Frede is right when he writes: ‘we always do philosophy against the 
background of the philosophical views and the philosophical reasoning of at least 
our immediate predecessors’ (1987, p.xiv). This cannot be a pervasive 
requirement, however, otherwise our subject could never have started. 
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4. Genealogy 
Let us turn to the second option. The underlying idea is that articulating our 
framework presupposes knowledge of its history. According to Williams, more 
baneful than the neglect of the history of philosophy has been the neglect of ‘the 
history of the concepts which philosophy is trying to understand’ (2002a, p.7). 
This position underwrites a broader historicism, since it makes philosophy 
dependent not just on the history of philosophy but on the entire history of ideas 
and perhaps even on history in general, depending on what forces shape our 
concepts. But how can it be sustained, given that the philosophical problems we 
currently confront have their roots in the present framework? 
 One proposal is to transpose the need for alternatives from the 
philosophical articulation to the articulated framework. Knowing about the history 
of our current framework liberates us from regarding the latter as unavoidable. 
This is what Skinner has in mind when he writes that ‘the indispensable value of 
studying the history of ideas’ is to learn ‘the distinction between what is necessary 
and what is the product merely of our own arrangements’ (1969, pp.52–3). 
 If we are to understand our framework in a philosophically enlightening 
way it is indeed crucial to establish what aspects of it, if any, are indispensable 
rather than optional products of contingent circumstances. Otherwise we cannot 
assess, for instance, Strawson’s claim that ‘there is a massive core of human 
thinking which has no history—or none recorded in histories of thought’ (1959, 
p.10). Nevertheless, the historicist argument runs into trouble. As regards 
philosophical articulations, at least there was no doubt as to the existence of 
diversity. As regards the framework itself, it is not even beyond dispute that there 
are genuine alternatives. Anti-relativists from Kant through Strawson to Davidson 
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have insisted that au fond human beings all share the same framework and that the 
alleged differences between epochs are merely superficial. If they are right, the 
argument that philosophers need to be familiar with alternative frameworks from 
the past is simply a non-starter. 
 There are good reasons for resisting the attack on the possibility of 
alternative frameworks (Dancy 1983; Hacker 1996).  In that case, however, the 
historicist argument fails on other grounds. If the apparent diversity of human 
cultures cannot be dismissed as deceptive, then it is synchronic as well as 
diachronic. Our framework differs from that of the ancient Greeks; yet it also 
differs, for example, from that of extant hunter-gatherers. Once more, synchronic 
diversity can take the place of diachronic diversity. Historiography is only one 
source for recognizing diversity, the other being cultural anthropology. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein and Quine have consciously employed fictional rather than actual 
anthropology to highlight the possibility of alternatives. This may even have the 
advantage that we can tailor the envisaged frameworks to the philosophical 
problems under discussion. 
 Williams employs a different argument for the need to look at the 
development of the framework. According to him, in the case of scientific 
concepts like that of an atom the question whether the same or a different concept 
is employed in different epochs and cultures does not matter much to ‘what may 
puzzle us about that concept now (for much the same reason that the history of 
science is not part of science)’. Unfortunately, Williams does not divulge this 
reason; and it is difficult to see why philosophical problems concerning scientific 
concepts should be less sensitive to conceptual variations than philosophical 
problems concerning non-scientific concepts. Be that as it may, Williams argues 
that the question of whether the same concept is employed in different settings 
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does matter for some philosophically contested concepts, namely those intimately 
tied to human interaction and communication, concepts like freedom, justice, truth 
and sincerity. In these cases it is imperative, he insists, to appreciate that their 
historical variants represent ‘different interpretations’ of a ‘common core’. We 
may be able to understand that core through functionalist reflections on the role 
these concepts fulfil in satisfying the demands of human life, as in fictions of a 
‘State of Nature’ which purport to explain the emergence of morality, language or 
the State. ‘But the State of Nature story already implies that there must be a 
further, real and historically dense story to be told’. Therefore we need a 
Nietzschean ‘genealogy’, a ‘method that combines a representation of universal 
requirements through the fiction of a State of Nature with an account of real 
historical development’ (2002a, p.7). 
 Williams defends genealogy against the accusation of relying on a genetic 
fallacy. According to him this charge ‘overlooks the possibility that the value in 
question may understand itself and present itself and claim authority for itself in 
terms which the genealogical story can undermine’. Thus liberal conceptions of 
morality ‘claimed to be the expression of a spirit that was higher, purer and more 
closely associated with reason, as well as transcending negative passions such as 
resentment’, and hence a genealogy is capable of displaying them as ‘self-
deceived in this respect’ (2002a, pp.7–9; see 2002, pp.20–40, 224–6). 
 If Williams is right, one reason why history is indispensable to philosophy 
is that the genesis of certain concepts or beliefs is crucial to their content and 
validity. That is to say, what such concepts or beliefs amount to and whether they 
are legitimate will depend on the source from which they derive. Even then, 
however, the basic idea of a genetic fallacy still stands. All Williams has shown is 
this: if a practice, belief or mode of thought defines or justifies itself in terms of a 
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particular origin, then that origin becomes relevant to its analysis and justification. 
The reason is not that there is after all no distinction between genesis on the one 
hand, content or validity on the other. Participants in the Catholic practice of 
ordination, for instance, defend it by reference to the idea of apostolic succession, 
and hence to a particular origin. In other cases the genesis of a practice provides a 
reason for or against it even if it is not actually adduced, e.g. when a legal norm 
has not been adopted through proper procedures. Yet the investigation of either 
the actual or the best possible reasons is not per se genetic; it merely takes on a 
genetic aspect in specific cases. 
 Concepts like that of a sun-burn or of lava are genetic in that they apply 
only to things with a certain origin. Even in these cases, however, it is not the 
history of the concept itself which is part of its content, but the history of its 
instances. To elucidate that content, philosophers only need to note that historical 
dimension; unlike empirical scientists who apply such concepts they do not need 
to examine the actual origin of potential candidates. 
 Finally, it is the status quo alone which determines whether a given 
concept is genetic or whether the actual or optimal justification of a belief or 
practice invokes its origins. Even if liberal morality originally laid claim to 
superior breeding, this entails neither that its current proponents justify it in this 
manner, nor that this is the best possible justification. If neither of these options 
holds, genealogy will be immaterial to the philosophical merits of liberal morality. 
And whether they hold does not depend on the historical origins of liberal 
morality. 
 Williams characterizes a genealogy as a ‘narrative that tries to explain a 
cultural phenomenon by describing a way in which it came about, or could have 
come about, or might be imagined to have come about’ (2002, p.20). The 
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inclusion of the last two disjuncts distances his genealogy from Nietzsche’s own, 
and assimilates it to a functional account, one which explains or justifies a 
phenomenon by pointing out that it serves a specific role in an actual or fictional 
practice. As Williams realizes, however, a functional explanation is not per se 
genetic. It is one thing to know the function of an organ, another to know its 
evolutionary emergence. Similarly, one can reflect on the function of our concept 
of knowledge (Craig 1990), without speculating about its origins. What counts is 
the current role which the concept has. 
 Williams’ response is that functional accounts of our discursive practices 
‘are simply false’. The value of these practices ‘always and necessarily goes 
beyond their function’, because their participants are rational agents who have 
their own reasons for engaging in them (2002, pp.34–5). But this observation 
suggests rather that a philosophical understanding of a practice must look beyond 
functional explanations in general, notably to the way in which the agents 
themselves would or could explain what it amounts to (rather than its genesis or 
function, of which they may well be ignorant) and justify its pursuit. It does not 
entail that the functional explanation must be temporalized by looking at the 
genesis of either the concepts, or the practices that give them point, or the agents 
that sustain them. 
 Revealingly, Williams’ own purportedly genealogical vindication of the 
virtues of truthfulness does not presuppose any history, actual or invented. To be 
sure, he considers a State of Nature involving a fictional society with primitive 
speakers. But the net justificatory yield of the exercise is that a practice of 
acquiring true beliefs and sharing them sincerely with others is advantageous to 
rational social creatures, since it allows them to pool information that is not 
directly available to any one individual. Williams strives hard to take this line of 
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reasoning beyond a purely utilitarian defence of an instrumental value. He insists 
that the beneficial practice of sharing information would be unstable unless its 
participants regarded accuracy and sincerity as good in their own rights. To this 
end he enriches the functional story by considering further aspects of the context 
of the practice, as well as potential threats to it. But the vindication relies purely 
on what it would be rational for creatures with human capacities, limitations and 
requirements to do within various scenarios. It does not depend on how the 
creatures or the scenarios emerged. The philosophical case of Truth and 
Truthfulness is anthropological-cum-epistemological rather than historical. 
 Williams may be right to contend that certain specific discursive practices 
are or should be based on genetic justifications that invite historical scrutiny. Yet 
he has not provided a general reason why any philosophical reflection on a 
concept or belief should require either a historical or a fictional account of its 
emergence. The popularity of mainline historicism notwithstanding, the absence 
of a compelling general case in its support should not come as a surprise. It is 
notoriously difficult to demonstrate for any specific method that it is essential to 
philosophy as such; some practitioners are even confident that they can attain 
philosophical insights without rational argument. 
 In this respect, the study of history is no worse off than many other 
procedures that have been declared indispensable to philosophy. In fact, it may be 
better off than many, since it is demonstrably useful. This may sound like an 
unexciting conclusion. But in philosophy the most modest positions are often 
supported by the strongest arguments. It is important to recognize that several 
points advanced by mainline historicists in fact count in favour of pragmatic 
historicism. One such point arises from the aforementioned difference between 
philosophy and empirical disciplines. Like other cognitive achievements, 
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philosophical understanding is accomplished through a communal effort. 
Furthermore, given the partly a priori and conceptual nature of philosophy, and 
the combination of continuity and change in the relevant concepts, the community 
of ideas relevant to our contemporary philosophical problems is not exhausted by 
contemporaries. The problems, methods and theories of the past have not simply 
been overtaken by empirical progress. As a result the endeavours of past thinkers 
remain a valuable source of inspiration, both positively and negatively. As 
mentioned above, for scientists and philosophers there is a definite premium on 
situating one’s efforts in the context of the ongoing debate. And in philosophy, 
that context has a historical dimension that reaches back further. For instance, we 
could scarcely be confident to see through the errors of complex philosophical 
views without the benefit of previous discussions. 
 At the same time we should acknowledge that for individual practitioners 
drawing on the history of philosophy can also have disadvantages for their 
substantive philosophizing. Even if the insights of past thinkers are real rather 
than presumed, relying on them can deprive one not just of an opportunity to hone 
one’s intellectual skills, but also of the potential benefits that accrue from 
recognizing alternative possibilities or even from fruitful errors. There is a need to 
balance the gains of doing philosophy historically against those of thinking off 
one’s own bat. Unlike pragmatic historicism, extreme and mainline historicism 
cannot do justice to this desideratum, the former because it simply reduces 
philosophy to the history of philosophy, the latter because it regards 
philosophizing off one’s own bat as impossible.  
 None of this militates against the aforementioned benefits of 
historiography. Philosophy as a whole profits substantially if the results of non-
historical brainstorms are understood and assessed on the background of previous 
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philosophical efforts. More specific benefits attach to knowledge of the evolution 
of our framework (as opposed to knowledge of unrelated synchronic alternatives). 
For one thing, certain previously dominant features of that framework may have 
receded, yet play an important role in our current philosophical puzzles. While in 
principle it is possible to retrieve such features from the current employment and 
function of these concepts, it may be easier to bring them into view by looking at 
earlier stages. Thus Anscombe and MacIntyre have suggested that some of our 
deontological concepts originally derived from the idea of a divine command. If 
they are right (and it is a substantial if), it will help to explain why these concepts 
seem to lay claim to an authority which is puzzling from a secular perspective. 
For another, if we are to profit from the philosophical reflections of the past, we 
must recognize conceptual differences and shifts concerning key terms. Otherwise 
we shall misidentify the questions and intellectual needs that these reflections 
addressed. 
 
5. Anachronism and Problematic Histories 
The second historicist protest against analytic philosophy is that it fails to heed 
this warning. Analytic philosophy, the story goes, is anachronistic because it treats 
the figures of the past like contemporaries whose ideas address our current 
preoccupations. According to Ayers, analytic philosophy pursues a ‘programme 
of flattening the past into the present’ (1978, p.55). Hacking speaks of the ‘pen-
friend approach to the history of philosophy’ (2002, p.27), while Baker and 
Hacker accuse mainstream Frege scholars of treating him ‘as an absent colleague, 
a contemporary fellow of Trinity on extended leave of absence’ (1984, p.4). 
 Analytic philosophers for their part have responded with a charge of 
antiquarianism. Traditional historians of philosophy, they allege, regard the past 
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as a museum which is to be treated with veneration rather than critical scrutiny. 
As a result their narratives are irrelevant to substantive philosophical problems, 
whatever their historical accuracy. In this vein Broad contrasted his own 
‘philosophical’ approach to history with a ‘historical and philological’ one (1930, 
p.2). The spirit of a history of ideas which brackets questions of philosophical 
truth and cogency was epitomized by Ross. After a lecture he was asked by a 
student whether Aristotle was right. He replied: ‘My dear child, you must not ask 
me such questions. I merely try to find out what Aristotle thought. To find out 
whether what he thought is true or not is not my business but that of the 
philosophers’ (Künne 1990, p.212). Such a pure history of ideas leaves open 
deliberately the philosophical issues raised by the past. It should not come as a 
surprise, therefore, that analytic historians have gone beyond it. But they have 
moved in different directions. 
 One historiographical perspective with analytic echoes is what Passmore 
calls ‘polemical’. Its ultimate aim is to expound the commentator’s own views; to 
this end it turns past thinkers into mouthpieces of contemporary views. In this 
vein, Broad suggested that scholarship is philosophically irrelevant. The only 
interest of our predecessors, he contends, is that ‘the clash of their opinions may 
strike a light which will help us to avoid the mistakes into which they have fallen’ 
(1930, pp.1–2). 
 The polemical approach invites an immediate objection. One cannot assess 
‘whether the old boy got anything right’ unless one has established what his views 
were in the first place (Rorty et al. 1984, p.10). This point is well taken, however, 
by most analytic historians (Passmore 1966, p.226). The only way of 
circumventing it is to bracket questions of interpretation completely. Thus Broad 
declared that he was interested only in the answers to the substantive questions 
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‘suggested’ by previous authors. More recently, Kripke has purported to provide 
an account of ‘Wittgenstein’s argument [on rule-following] as it struck Kripke’, 
rather than a faithful exegesis (1982, p.5). In so far as it uses past figures merely 
as Rorschach blots, such an approach amounts to historiophobia by the backdoor. 
 A third analytic stance is doxography. It does not abstain from attributing 
views to authors of the past. At the same time, it rests content with comparing and 
contrasting positions, without fretting over the wider context or actual relations of 
intellectual influence. Thus Dummett recounts a ‘history of thought’—of 
propositions and arguments standing in abstract relations of support or conflict—
rather than a ‘history of thinkers’ (1993: ch.1). Doxographical approaches are 
committed to exegetical accuracy; yet in so far as they tell any developmental 
narrative it is a fictional reconstruction from a contemporary perspective. As a 
result, they are open to the historicist challenge that what a thinker thinks is 
accessible only by placing his thinking in a historical context. 
 To varying degrees, therefore, polemical, Rorschach and doxographical 
approaches commit the sin of anachronism. Fortunately, they do not exhaust the 
options for analytic historians. A majority of them favours what Passmore calls 
‘problematic histories’. This approach is based on the aforementioned idea that 
philosophy has its roots in problems of a special kind, and that its history is an 
evolution of these problems and of their solutions. Problematic historians ponder 
questions like: why were people exercised by certain questions, why did they 
utilize certain methods for tackling them, and why did they find certain solutions 
attractive? Problematic history is by no means the prerogative of analytic 
philosophers. But it has been especially congenial to analytic historians. On the 
one hand, problematic histories deal with the actual development of philosophy. 
On the other hand, they do so in a philosophical spirit. They seek to understand 
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how these developments contributed to the content of our contemporary problems 
and theories. 
 
6. Historicist Relativism 
Problematic history has not been spared historicist fire. Krüger complains that its 
‘assumption of the persistence of problems is at odds with the claim that 
philosophy advances’, to which it is also committed, and leaves it at a loss to 
explain the emergence of new problems. Furthermore, philosophical problems are 
not ‘autonomous’ but change along with the wider cultural and social context 
(1984, pp.81–5). 
 But problematic histories do not need to assume that philosophy inevitably 
progresses. Furthermore, progress does not rule out the persistence of problems. 
For it can consist in gaining a better understanding of the problems and the 
options for tackling them. This is precisely one of the things analytic philosophers 
have aspired to. Moore put philosophical difficulties down to ‘the attempt to 
answer questions without first discovering precisely what question it is which you 
desire to answer’ (1903, p.vi). And in a spirited plea for analytic philosophy 
Beckermann points out that philosophical progress ‘often amounts to the 
clarification rather than the solution of problems’ (2004, p.10; also Kenny 2005). 
 Problematic historians, including analytic specimen like Passmore and von 
Wright, can also acknowledge the embeddedness of philosophy. Understanding a 
text properly often requires acquaintance with its philosophical and cultural 
context. One real bone of contention is whether it inevitably requires knowledge 
of external social factors, as historicists (Rée 1978, p.30; Hylton 1992, p.3) and 
sociologists of knowledge (Kusch 1995) suggest. Contrary to their assumption, it 
is actually a moot question which contextual features have what kind of relevance 
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to interpretation In so far as there is a general answer, it depends on hermeneutic 
issues that historicists have tended to shirk (see sct. 7). It should be obvious that 
those aspects of the context which the author herself assumes to be familiar to 
readers or which concern tacit assumptions of her reasoning are more important 
than the economic conditions of the text’s production. More generally, if we seek 
a philosophical understanding of the content of a text rather than a genetic 
(historical, sociological, psychological) explanation of its creation, there is a 
strong case for insisting that only those contextual features matter which the 
author herself could adduce in its explanation and defence (see Frede 1987, pp.ix–
xxvii; Skinner 1969, p.28).1 
 The real crux is whether embeddedness militates against an ambition 
which is central to analytic historians: to understand the past in order to derive 
substantive philosophical lessons. Whilst this ambition is compatible with 
acknowledging the ‘horizontal’ impact of the context, it presupposes that there is 
also ‘vertical’ continuity across time. The problems, arguments and claims of  
remote philosophical theories must be intelligible to us, so that we can assess 
them for their trans-historical merits. 
 Precisely this possibility is denied by a distinctly historicist version of 
relativism. If correct, this historicist relativism would not just vindicate 
accusations of anachronism against analytic historians, it would also lend succour 
to extreme historicism. For it implies that the attempt to come up with objectively 
                                                 
1 My preferred route to that conclusion runs as follows. An author has first-person authority 
about what she means by a sentence or text. In so far as texts are simply expressions of speaker’s 
or author’s meaning, this settles the issue. A complication arises because there is a potential 
difference between author’s meaning and literal meaning, what the sentence or text actually 
means in a linguistic community at a particular time. Extreme forms of externalism 
notwithstanding, however, competent speakers must be able to explain even the literal meaning of 
their expressions (see Glock 2003, pp.247-8). 
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valid responses to timeless philosophical problems and arguments is futile, and 
hence that the enterprise of substantive philosophizing should be abandoned in 
favour of an exclusively historical-cum-sociological examination of philosophical 
ideas. 
 Historicist relativists inveigh against the idea of ‘eternally available’ 
problems and positions (Rée 1978, pp.12, 28). The ‘sense of continuity’ driving 
analytic historians is ‘illusory’, they believe. There is insufficient ‘agreement in 
concepts and standards to provide grounds for deciding between the rival and 
incompatible claims’ of different ‘modes of philosophical thought’ (MacIntyre 
1984, pp.33–4), and consequently ‘attempts to pass judgement on the worth of 
philosophical positions sub specie aeternitatis are misconceived’ (Baker 1988, 
p.xii). 
 Many historicists seem to assume that such relativistic conclusions are 
guaranteed by the fact that we always understand and assess a philosophical 
position from our own perspective. From this it follows that what we believe to be 
the content and validity of a philosophical view is inevitably shaped (to a greater 
or lesser extent) by our specific historical circumstances. It does not follow, 
however, that what content and validity these views actually have is relative to 
such circumstances. For we must distinguish between what is believed to be the 
case and what is actually the case. I cannot believe that p yet—at the same time—
believe that my belief that p is false. But of course this does not prevent me from 
acknowledging that this belief may turn out to be false. For this reason, there is no 
incoherence in the ‘absolutist’ ambition to find out what is actually true, for 
instance with respect to the questions of what a given philosophical position 
amounts to and whether it is correct. 
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 Accordingly, historicist relativism cannot be vindicated simply by appeal 
to the ‘perspectival’ nature of belief. A weightier argument in its support derives 
from Rorty’s claim that fundamentally different philosophical positions are 
incommensurable: they cannot be assessed objectively from a neutral standpoint 
(1979, ch.VII). Incommensurability comes in two versions, semantic and 
methodological or epistemic (see Sankey 1999). Semantic incommensurability has 
it that we lack objective standards of assessment because there is semantic 
variance between the vocabularies of different theories. But meaning variance 
does not entail translation failure. There is no one-to-one correspondence 
between Russian and English colour terms, but this does not militate against 
compound translations such as ‘light blue’. Even in the more fraught cases 
familiar from scientific revolutions, nothing prevents followers of a theory T2 
from modifying their conceptual apparatus in order to gloss T1, notably by 
introducing new terms or constructions based on their own vocabulary. It is a 
moot question whether such procedures always yield synonymous phrases. Even 
this kind of translation failure does not entail mutual unintelligibility, however, 
since proponents of T2 can acquire the conceptual apparatus of T1 without 
endorsing it. Aristotelians and Kantians who hold to the centrality of enduring 
particulars are capable of mastering the ‘perdurantist’ idiom of space-time worms, 
even if they regard it as derived and confusing. ‘Aetna erupted’ is not 
synonymous to ‘Part of the life-long filament of space-time taken up by Aetna is 
an eruption’. Nevertheless, it is obviously possible to understand both sentences 
and to realize that they necessarily have the same truth-value. 
 Historicist relativists maintain not merely that understanding the content of 
past theories requires acknowledging their context. They invoke semantic 
incommensurability by suggesting that outside of their original environment these 
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theories no longer have the same content, and hence that any attempt to 
understand them in our contemporary idiom is doomed. What they repudiate is 
neatly epitomized by  Bennett’s view that ‘we understand Kant only in proportion 
as we can say, clearly and in contemporary terms, what his problems were, which 
of them are still problems and what contribution Kant made to their solution’ 
(1966, back cover). To this Ayers objects that we can only interpret a past thinker 
‘in his own terms’ (1978, p.54). Taken literally, this would confine interpreters to 
the vocabulary of the author. The obvious difficulty is that this vocabulary is often 
unfamiliar to us. In such cases, Ayers’ prescription obliges us to explain an 
obscure text in other, equally obscure terms. But in order to understand something 
more than nominally, we must be able to explain it in terms that are intelligible to 
us. 
 One might retort that we can render an ancient theory intelligible simply 
by immersing ourselves in its vocabulary. There is an important insight in this 
proposal. Immersion in the past can lead to ideas and distinctions which are not 
readily available in contemporary idiom. Witness the incorporation of Aristotelian 
and Kantian terminology into post-war analytic philosophy. It does not follow, 
however, that we can understand an old vocabulary, let alone adopt it in a 
responsible manner, without being able to explicate it in our own. For this would 
require that an individual operate two distinct vocabularies with understanding, 
yet without any capacity to explain the terms of one in terms of the other to any 
degree. The idea of such ‘semantic schizophrenia’ is mystifying. Even if it can be 
coherently explained, moreover, it should be the last resort in accounting for the 
relation between different theories. 
 Semantic incommensurability is not a palatable option for historicists. If 
the figures of the past were so alien that we could never comprehend them in 
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contemporary terms, studying them would be futile. It should not come as a 
surprise, therefore, that historicists ultimately grant semantic commensurability, at 
least when their own readings are at stake (e.g. MacIntyre 1984, pp.42–3). 
Apparently the threat of incommensurability hangs like a thick fog over the 
history of our subject when it is approached by the rude search-lights of analytic 
philosophers, yet miraculously lifts when historicists cast an elegant glance on it. 
 Historicist relativism must instead hinge on epistemic incommensurability. 
Thus for Rorty there is no vantage point from which to adjudicate between 
philosophical positions from different periods, since there is no ‘independent test 
of accuracy of representation’, no way of stepping outside of our belief system as 
a whole and comparing  it with reality (1991, p.6). It is far from obvious that 
objective philosophical assessment requires such an incoherent feat (Baldwin 
2002, pp.272–3). One alternative is to judge theories by their internal consistency 
and the extent to which they meet their own targets. At the same time, historicist 
relativism is susceptible to several objections. 
 For one thing, its relativistic conclusion may be self-refuting, because it is 
implicitly committed to claiming a correctness which it explicitly rejects. 
Consistent historicists would have to regard their own animadversions against 
problematic histories as no more than the expression of a different Zeitgeist. 
Moreover, from the fact that specific philosophical ideas must be understood 
against the background of a more or less extensive context, it does not follow that 
they can only be understood by accepting that context. We may acknowledge that 
a particular statement is intelligible, plausible or compelling given other 
assumptions accepted by the author. This does not prevent us from questioning 
the statement, if we have reasons to reject those assumptions. Conversely, we can 
criticize a claim which we may regard as correct on the grounds that it is 
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incompatible with this background. Either way, the need to reckon with context in 
no way removes the possibility of rational assessment. 
 Finally, historicist relativists incline towards circular reasoning. On the 
one hand, relativism is supposed to be a lesson from history; on the other hand, 
that lesson is only revealed to those who approach history in a relativistic spirit. 
Hacking draws attention to the immediate way in which a text like the 
Meditations speaks to contemporary undergraduates (2002, pp.27–33, 56–7). 
There is no reason to regard them as deluded. Descartes’ claim that nothing in my 
experience indicates whether I am dreaming was a heuristic device aimed at 
laying foundations for a new positive science. But this in no way precludes its use 
as a sceptical argument. Nor does it prevent a rational confrontation between 
Descartes’ claim and the counter claims of later epistemologists keen to resist 
scepticism. 
 
7. Hermeneutic Equity 
We have found no compelling argument against the ‘analytic’ project of assessing 
ancient theories for their philosophical merit. In fact, the boot is on the other foot. 
Far from being the only way of revealing the past, to abstain from judgement may 
even mean to conceal it. To understand her subject, the historian needs to have a 
genuine sense of what it is to take a stance on philosophical problems. For the 
detached attitude recommended and occasionally affected by historicists is at odds 
with the engaged attitude of past philosophers. Furthermore, as Frede has argued 
(1987, p.xii), a full historical understanding of the fact that a philosopher held a 
certain view requires a philosophical understanding of that view. Otherwise we 
will not be in a position to decide whether he had good reasons for holding it or 
whether that fact must be explained aetiologically by reference to external factors. 
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 There is a further objection to philosophical abstinence. In the hermeneutic 
tradition we encounter a ‘principle of equity’ according to which a good 
interpretation of a text presumes that its author is rational, unless the opposite has 
been demonstrated. And in analytic discussions of ‘radical interpretation’ we find 
a ‘principle of charity’ according to which we should not translate utterances of a 
completely alien language as being obviously false. 
To the combatants in the historicism battle, these hermeneutic principles 
are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they intertwine exegetical and 
substantive issues, by suggesting that we cannot even understand a text without 
taking a stance towards its claims. On the other hand, they threaten to open the 
substantive case only to shut it at once, since they seem to imply that the stance 
we must adopt is an affirmative one. Instead of favouring a hard-hitting analytic 
approach, this would give succour to the reverential attitude of the traditionalists. 
 But how sharp is the sword anyway? Note first that the hermeneutic term 
‘equity’ is superior to the analytic ‘charity’, since it avoids the suggestion that 
interpretation requires some kind of moral or cognitive forbearance. Next, we 
must keep apart three dimensions of equity: 
1. assuming that the expressed views are by-and-large true;  
2. assuming that these views are by-and-large coherent; 
3. assuming that the utterance or text is suited to the speaker’s or author’s 
purposes. 
Some formulations of equity make it appear as if proper interpretation precludes 
the possibility of ascribing irrational views. In fact, however, equity demands only 
a fallible presumption of rationality, which can be defeated in any individual case. 
Its proponents insist on a ‘supporting consensus’ (Gadamer 1967, pp.104–5), a 
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background of shared assumptions which enables disagreement in detail precisely 
because it rules out ‘massive error’ (Davidson 1984, pp.168–9). 
 There remains disagreement on the scope of the required consensus. Quine 
prohibits only the ascription of beliefs that are evident empirical falsehoods or 
explicit logical contradictions. Davidson, by contrast, occasionally favours charity 
‘across the board’, to all types of beliefs, and entreats us to ‘maximize agreement’ 
with the interpretees. This procedure is forced upon us, he reckons, because in 
radical interpretation we neither know what the natives think nor what their 
utterances mean. Assuming that they believe what we do is the only way of 
solving this equation with two unknowns (1984, pp.xvii, 101, 136–7). 
 This kind of equity would indeed rule out any significant disagreement 
with an interpreted text. But it is misguided. In intra-linguistic communication—
philosophical exchanges included—we can take for granted a shared 
understanding of most expressions, an agreement which opens up the possibility 
of disagreeing in our beliefs. Even in radical interpretation the maximization of 
agreement is not inevitable but would lead to misinterpretation. It is wrong to 
ascribe opinions we take to be correct even in cases in which there is no 
explanation of how subjects could have acquired them. Interpretations should 
ascribe beliefs that it is plausible for people to have, whether or not they coincide 
with ours (Glock 2003, pp.194–9). 
 A second argument for maximizing agreement concerns reference. It 
would be misguided to entertain the possibility that the beliefs of a subject about a 
topic X are all and sundry wrong; for in that case we have no longer any grounds 
for assuming that these views are indeed about X. ‘Too much attributed error risks 
depriving the subject of his subject matter’ (Davidson 1984, p.200). This insight 
does not, however, support Davidson’s stronger thesis that most of a subject’s 
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beliefs about X must be true, and that the errors we normally lumber our 
predecessors with are too massive: 
… how clear are we that the ancients …. believed that the earth was 
flat? This earth? Well, this earth of ours is part of the solar system, a 
system partly identified by the fact that it is a gaggle of large, cool, 
solid bodies circling around a very large, hot star. If someone believes 
none of this about the earth, is it certain that it is the earth that he is 
thinking about? (1984, p.168). 
‘Yes!’ is the correct—if unsolicited—answer to Davidson’s rhetorical question. 
To be thinking about the earth one does not need to be right on the scientific 
topics he mentions. All that is needed are identifications like: ‘The vast body on 
which we are currently standing’ or ‘The body which comprises the continents 
and the oceans’. Consider someone who points to the ground and says sincerely: 
‘We are currently standing on an enormous flat disk. If you continue moving in 
the same direction you’ll eventually fall off the edge’. That person clearly 
believes the earth to be flat, just as we believe it to be spherical. 
Two of these hermeneutic lessons apply directly to philosophical 
interpretation. First, we cannot simply maximize agreement, since it would be 
blatantly anachronistic to credit ancient texts with insights which became 
available only later. Secondly, the need to comprehend the background does not 
entail an obligation to adumbrate it. To understand Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason requires a host of contextual knowledge, from details like the legal 
background of his term ‘deduction’ to the tension between his a prioristic 
conception of natural science on the one hand and his empiricist animadversions 
against metaphysics on the other. Nonetheless an interpreter can avail herself of 
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this background without endorsing it, and without averting her eyes from the 
aforementioned tension. 
In other respects philosophical texts present a unique challenge. 
Philosophical disputes are of a very fundamental kind, yet without revolving 
around the basic observational errors that even moderate equity rules out. Often 
the disagreement is not about the factual truths of empirical claims, but about the 
understanding of particular concepts. While we can take many terms for granted 
here, this does not hold for those which are philosophically contested in a 
particular passage. Accordingly, factual truth is largely irrelevant and conceptual 
truth cannot be taken for granted. But while this reinforces the need to avoid 
anachronism when confronting ancient theories, it does not oblige us to 
presuppose that the latter are true. 
 As regards the second aspect of equity, there is a case for denying that one 
can believe explicit contradictions. If someone utters a sentence of the form ‘p & 
~ p’ without qualifying it (e.g. concerning time or respect), this is a criterion for 
his not having understood that sentence, and therefore incompatible with his 
thereby expressing the alleged belief. If so, it is unclear how one could entertain 
beliefs of this kind without undermining one’s status as a genuine subject of 
beliefs. Nevertheless, one can hold beliefs which turn out to be contradictory, that 
is, which defy being spelled out in a coherent fashion. 
 But when it comes to interpreting texts, even the ascription of explicit 
contradictions is not off limits. For a text is not an immediate expression of a 
single belief. It may instead manifest beliefs which the author held at different 
stages of composition. Because of inattention an author may also fail to recognize 
that a view expressed on page X is incompatible with one expressed on page Y, or 
he may simply have committed a slip in writing down the text. Commentators 
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who believe that one must never ascribe inconsistent views to a text have, I 
suspect, never bothered to reread their own writings. 
 Similarly for the third aspect of equity. On occasion it is more equitable to 
regard a text as an obscure expression of the author’s message, simply because the 
alternative would lumber it with views which are evidently mistaken or at odds 
with other parts of the corpus. Different aspects of equity can come into conflict, 
which means that we must weigh different considerations, based on our 
knowledge of each individual case. Therefore equity can never reign supreme, but 
must be tailored to text and author. 
 We saw that in order to achieve more than a nominal understanding we 
need to relate the text to our terms, interests, and beliefs. Now it emerged that we 
need not project most of our beliefs onto the interpretees. These two points favour 
the critical engagement with the past espoused by analytic historians. But the most 
striking formulation of this conjunction hails from Gadamer. On the one hand we 
relate the text to our own concerns and convictions; on the other hand the text 
poses a challenge, in so far as its claims are at variance with what we take to be 
true (1960, pp.286–90). The ideal result is a dialogue, a ‘fusion of horizons’. The 
interpreter is open to the text precisely because she treats it as a philosophical 
challenge. She allows the text to question both her own understanding of it and 
her prejudgments about the matter at issue. The dialogue may either necessitate a 
revision of her interpretation, or of her prejudgements, or it may confirm the 
original attribution of error. In none of these cases, however, can the interpreter 
ignore issues of truth and cogency. 
 Resisting charity across the board makes room not just for counting the 
interpretees wrong. It may transpire that on some issues they not only hold 
different views, but that they are right and we are wrong! In approaching a foreign 
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text or culture, we must keep in mind the possibility that we might have 
something to learn. That is one lesson of the hermeneutic tradition which even its 
analytic admirers have yet to assimilate. But it is a lesson which chimes well with 
the practice of analytic historians, according to which we should learn from a text 
by taking it seriously as raising issues and evincing claims of substantive interest. 
 The historicist bracketing of substantive issues ultimately fails because 
philosophical texts make cognitive claims of a non-historical kind. 
Comprehension of these claims is aided by knowledge of the issues discussed. 
The idea that the history of a discipline profits from neutrality about the validity 
of the examined claims or even from ignorance about their subject matter is no 
more plausible with respect to philosophy than it is with respect to science. The 
alleged impudence of treating philosophical texts sub specie aeternitatis in fact 
amounts to no more than this: analytic philosophers speak in their own voice, 
instead of constantly disavowing their own beliefs. Mindful of the difference 
between belief and truth they are also aware that their beliefs might turn out to be 
false. And if they are historically conscious, and a rising number of them are, they 
will also be aware that reading a text from the past puts both the author and the 
interpreter to precisely this test. 
 Analytic philosophy pursued in this spirit can avail itself of all the 
advantages of paying heed to the past that emerged from the historicist arguments. 
But it need not accept the conclusions of extreme or of mainstream historicism. 
Philosophy cannot be reduced to the history of philosophy or the history of 
concepts. And although it can benefit immensely from problematic histories, it 
can be pursued successfully without them. Finally, both philosophy and its history 
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are better off without the popular prejudice that finding fault with the texts of the 
past is incompatible with comprehending them.2 
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